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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 940231-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

BRUCE LABEAU,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
dangerous weapon at a correctional facility, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4) (c) (Supp.
1994), in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was defendant prejudiced by the trial court's

denial of his motion to excuse two potential jurors for cause
where the State used the first two of its four peremptory
challenges to remove those same potential jurors from the jury?
A defendant claiming that a trial court failed to
remove a juror for cause must demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by that failure by showing that a member of the jury was partial
or incompetent.
(Utah 1994) .

State v. Menzies, 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24

2.

Did the trial court properly reject defendant's

claim that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4) (c) (Supp. 1994) is
unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term
"dangerous weapon" where the term "dangerous weapon" is defined
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1992), which expressly states
that its definition of "dangerous weapon" apples to other
provisions title 76?
A trial court's decision on the constitutionality of a
statute presents a pure question of law that is reviewed for
correctness without according any deference to the trial court.
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah App. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (Supp. 1994), Items
prohibited in correctional facilities -- Penalties:
(4)(c) Any offender who possesses at a
correctional facility any firearm,
ammunition, dangerous weapon, explosive,
or implement of escape is guilty of a
second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601. Definitions:
(5)

"Dangerous weapon" means any item
capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury, or a facsimile or
representation of the item, and:

(a) the actor's use or apparent intended
use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally of in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of
a dangerous weapon by an offender at a correctional facility, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8311-3(4) (c) (Supp. 1994) (R. 1-2, 72-3).

Following defendant's

jury trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged in the
information (R.145-46, 316-17).

The trial court entered judgment

against defendant and sentenced him to a term of one to 15 years
in the Utah State Prison (R. 149-51).

Defendant appeals from

that judgment.
Defense counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 11>96 (1967)
STATEMENT OF TEE FACTS1
Defen.^it was an inmate h-^sed at the Iron County/Utah
State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah (R. 233-34).

On

June 10, 1993, correctional officers suspected that defendant was
intoxicated because he was having difficulty standing and
walking, and because his speech was slurred (R. 238, 241, 248).
Defendant was told to return to his cell and that officials
intended to have him perform a breath intoxilyzer test to check
if he was intoxicated (R. 249-52).
Correction Officers Richard Dickinson, James Mitchell,
and Glen Allred went to defendant's cell to escort him to another

1

Unless otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts from
the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989); see also State v.
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989).
3

area of the prison for testing (R. 252-53) . The officers
attempted to persuade defendant to go with them voluntarily, but
defendant refused to be moved and told the officers, "[d]o what
you got to do" (R. 263-64).

When the officers entered

defendant's cell to handcuff him for transportation, they learned
that the floor of his cell had been "soaped up," a procedure that
inmates use to make it difficult for officers to enter the cell
because it makes the officers "slip and slide" (R. 261-2, 266).
The officers were nonetheless able to handcuff defendant, conduct
a cursory patdown search of him, and escort defendant to the
admissions area for the intoxilyzer test (R. 253).
Efforts to get defendant to perform the intoxilyzer
test were unsuccessful (R. 242) . After several attempts, the
officers decided to put defendant in a holding cell.

Before

removing defendant from admissions, the officers again searched
defendant for weapons (R. 267). During that search, Mitchell
found a "shank" in defendant front right pocket (R. 268-70, 278) .
A "shank" is "a homemade knife" constructed by a prison inmate
that is used "to inflict injury" on other inmates or guards (R.
259-60) . Specifically, shanks are objects such as gym equipment
of flatware that inmates sharpen and sometimes wrap with tape or
cloth to make a handle (R. 243-44) .
Based on the recovery of the shank found in defendant's
possession while he was an inmate at the Iron County/Utah State
Correctional Facility, defendant was charged with possession of a

4

dangerous weapon at a correctional facility, and the matter was
set for a jury trial.
Following voir dire of the prospective jurors, a bench
conference was held at which defendant challenged two prospective
jurors for cause.

The substance of that conference was restated

for the record as follows:
THE COURT:

Okay. The jury has now exited. For
that matter, we had a -- counsel had a
conversation at the bench regarding Mr.
Holm's two challenges for cause. We
probably ought to restate it in case it
wasn't picked up.

MR. HOLM:

Yes, Your Honor. I challenged Mrs.
Koyle and Mrs. Decker for cause. Mrs.
Koyle because she's employed by youth
corrections. I believe that's a close
enough connection with the department of
corrections that she ought to be
dismissed. And Mrs. Decker because her
daughter is in the attorney general's
office, which, of course, is a
prosecutorial agency and is the State of
Utah, basically.

THE COURT:

All right. I denied the request and
allowed them to be seated for the reason
that they had -- they had indicated that
they did not feel a bias and would be
comfortable handling the case or being
in Mr. LaBeau's position even if a juror
--if there was a juror with their
attitude on the jury.
And so having made a record of that,
what was your --

MR. BURNS:

My record is just briefly, Your Honor,
out of an overabundance of caution, I
would like the record to reflect that
the State used its initial peremptory
challenges to remove juror number one,
Ms. Koyle, and juror number 14, Ms.
Decker. Those are the very jurors that
defendant objected to.
5

While I agreed with the Court that it
was distant, and both jurors said that
they could hear the evidence fairly, for
purposes of any claim whatsoever on
appeal, the record should state that the
State agreed and used its peremptory
challenges to remove those two jurors.
THE COURT:

Okay.

A handwritten note should reflect

that as well.
Any other matters?
MR. HOLM:
(R. 223-224) .

Nothing further, Your Honor.

(Copies of these pages of the record are attached

hereto as addendum A.)

The "voir dire jury list" indicates that

the State removed Ms. Koyle and Ms. Decker with peremptory
challenges (R. 123).
After the State rested, defendant moved for dismissal
on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3(4) (c) (Supp. 1994)
was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term
"dangerous weapon" (R. 288-93).

(Copies of these pages of the

record are attached hereto as addendum B.)

The trial court

denied defendant's motion because the term "dangerous weapon" is
defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1992), and the
question of whether the "shank" defendant had in his possession
was within the scope of that definition was a jury question (R.
293).

The jury's verdict of guilty evidences its determination

that the shank taken from defendant was a dangerous weapon.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim that the trial court failed to remove
two jurors for cause is wholly frivolous because the State used
its first two peremptory challenges to strike the jurors in

6

question.

Accordingly, defendant can demonstrate no prejudice

flowing from the court's ruling.
Defendant's other claim, that he was denied due process
because the term "dangerous weapon" is not defined under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) (Supp. 1994), is wholly frivolous
because that termed is defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5)
(1992), which is applicable to all provisions of title 76. In
any event, ordinary people would easily recognize that
defendant's homemade knife was a dangerous weapon.

This Court

should affirm defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO STRIKE TWO POTENTIAL
JURORS THAT DEFENDANT CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE
Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's
refusal to dismiss two members of the jury pool for cause.
Accordingly, defendant's claim that the trial court improperly
denied his for cause challenges to potential jurors Koyle and
Decker should be rejected on the grounds that any alleged error
was harmless.

See e.q. State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1140

(Utah 1989) (alleged error does not require reversal unless
defendant demonstrates that there is a reasonable likelihood that
a more favorable outcome would have been obtained had the alleged
error not occurred).
Under State v. Menzies, 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah
1994), "tt]o prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to
7

remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice,
viz.,

show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent."

In this case, not only does defendant not allege that a member of
the jury was partial or incompetent, but defendant was not even
forced to use any of his peremptory challenges to have either
Koyle or Decker removed.

Rather, the State used its first two

peremptory challenges to strike the challenged jurors from the
panel (R. 123, 223-34).

Accordingly, defendant can claim no

prejudice flowing from the trial court's alleged error in failing
to remove Koyle and Decker for cause.

Defendant's assertion to

the contrary should be rejected as wholly frivolous.
POINT II
THE STATUTE PROHIBITING INMATES PROM
POSSESSING DANGEROUS WEAPONS IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
The trial court properly rejected defendant's claim
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) (Supp. 1994) was
unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term
"dangerous weapon."

It is well established that Utah courts

"presume the constitutionality" of statutes.
846 P.2d at 465.

See, e.g. Pharris,

In order to overcome the presumption of

constitutionality accorded statutes, defendant argues section 768-311.3(4) (c) is invalid under the due process void-for-vagueness
doctrine.

That doctrine requires a statute to define an "offense

with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
8

Kolander v.

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983) (quoted
in Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466) . Here, defendant argues that
section 76-8-311.3(4) (c) is unconstitutionally vague because it
does not define the term "dangerous weapon."

The trial court

properly rejected that claim.
The term "dangerous weapon55 is clearly defined under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1992).

That provision expressly

states that the definition of dangerous weapon articulated
therein applies to all other provisions of title 76. The trial
court recognized that fact in the proceedings below (R. 291-92),
and instructed the jury on the definition of dangerous weapon
accordingly (R. 132). Moreover, section 76-1-601(5) aside,
"ordinary people" would readily recognize that a homemade knife
such as that confiscated from defendant is a "dangerous weapon"
because it plainly can be used to inflict serious bodily injury
or to cause death.

The trial court's rejection of defendant's

void-for-vagueness challenge to section 76-8-311.3 (4) (c) should
therefore be upheld because defendant's complaint is wholly
frivolous.

9

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
deem the issues raised by defendant wholly frivolous, affirm
defendant's conviction and allow defense counsel to withdraw from
representation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T ^

day of November,

1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

TODD A. UTZIN0ER
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, via first class
mail, to Floyd W. Holm, attorney for appellant, 965 South Main,
Suite 3, P.O. Box 765, Cedar City, Utah

84720, this Y —

November, 1994.
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Addendum A
Transcript of Defendant's Motion to
Strike Jurors Koyle and Decker
and Trial Court's Ruling

65
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BURNS:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

You can go ahead and go to the

lobby.
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court
and counsel in open court out of the hearing of
the jury, which was recorded as follows:)
THE COURT:

Okay.

that matter, we had a —

The jury has now exited.

For

counsel had a conversation at the

bench regarding Mr. Holm's two challenges for cause.

We

probably ought to restate it in case it wasn't picked up.
MR. HOLM:

Yes, Your Honor.

I challenged

Mrs. Koyle and Mrs. Decker for cause. Mrs. Koyle because
she's employed by youth corrections.

I believe that's a

close enough connection with the department of corrections
that she ought to be dismissed.

And Mrs. Decker because

her daughter is in the attorney general's office, which, of
course, is a prosecutorial agency and is the State of Utah,
basically.
THE COURT: All right.

I denied the request and

allowed them to be seated for the reason that they had —
they had indicated that they did not feel a bias and would
be comfortable handling the case or being in Mr. LaBeau's
position even if a juror on —

if there were a juror with

their attitude on the jury.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
n n r\

1

And so having made a record of that, what was

2

your

—

3

MR. BURNS: My record is just briefly, Your

4

Honor, out of an overabundance of caution, I would like the

5

record to reflect that the State used its initial

6

peremptory challenges to remove juror number one,

7

Ms. Koyle, and juror number 14, Ms. Decker.

8

very jurors that the defendant objected to.

9

Those are the

While I agreed with the Court that it was

10

distant, and both jurors said that they could hear the

11

evidence fairly, for purposes of any claim whatsoever on

12

appeal, the record should state that the State agreed and

13

used its peremptory challenges to remove those two jurors.

14

THE COURT:

15

reflect that as well.

Okay.

16

Any other matters?

17

MR. HOLM:

18

THE COURT:

A handwritten note should

Nothing further, Your Honor.
Okay.

Let's take a 15-minute

19

recess.

20

lobby area.

21

rest room, he's welcome to use the jury facilities.

22

I

I've got the jury out of the courtroom and in the
So if Mr. LaBeau needs a drink or to use the

MR. BURNS:

Thank you.

23

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.

Let's do this.

attorneys, and then I think the jurors —

Let's get the

I was just

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

n~-iy)

Addendum B
Transcript of Trial Court's Ruling on
Defendant's Void-for-Vagueness Challenge
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-311.3 (c) (4) (Supp. 1994)

1

MR. HOLM:

Your Honor, may we take a short

2

recess and take up a matter out of the presence of the

3

jury?

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll ask the jury

—

5

If you'll escort them to the jury room.

6

We have got a rest room and I hope water and

7

cups in there.

8

take up a legal matter and then have you brought out in a

9

few minutes.

10
11

But if you will go to the jury room, we'll

Do we have enough chairs in there?

Sometimes

~

okay.

12

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court

13

and counsel in open court out of the hearing of

14

the jury, which was recorded as follows:)

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

The jury has left the

courtroom.

17

MR. HOLM:

Thank you, Your Honor.

18

At this time, we'd like to make a motion to

19

dismiss for failure to show a prima facie case.

The basis

20

for my motion, Your Honor, is basically this.

21

definition under the offense that Mr. LaBeau has been

22

charged with of a dangerous weapon.

23

can find.

24

procedure, the defendant has to be given some indication of

25

the crime of which he is charged.

There is no

At least not that I

And as I understand criminal law —

criminal

And there has to be some

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1~?1

1

reasonable clarity, I guess, in the statutes as to what is

2

criminal and what is not, otherwise, under the United

3

States Constitution, it's void for vagueness.

4

you want to look at Section 76-8-311.3, there is no

5

definition whatsoever as to what a dangerous weapon is, and

6

so I don't see how there's -- how —

7

the sense of Mr. LaBeau knows that his possession of this

8

shank was —

9

And if —

if

how we have clarity in

was, in fact, a crime.

The statute does define "offender," it defines

10

"correctional facility," it defines "medicine," it defines

11

"official custody," but for one reason or another, it does

12

not define the dangerous weapon.

13

reason, it's void for vagueness, and that the case ought to

14

be dismissed.

And we think for that

15

THE COURT: Mr. Burns?

16

MR. BURNS: Well, it's a unique argument.

It

17

doesn't define knowing and intentionally, which the State

18

also has to prove.

19

doesn't define state of Utah; it doesn't talk about the

20

respective requirements of jurisdiction and venue.

21

the Court is well aware that if the definition is found at

22
23

It does not define Iron County; it

I think

I or near the applicable statute, that can be used.
The Court can also look to other provisions in

24

the criminal code where the legislature has saw fit to

25

define words. And if it wants, the Court can go to the

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

T-HO

1.5.5

dictionary and define words for purposes of —

of clarity

with respect to their common use and meaning.
"Dangerous weapon" is found defined in the
criminal code.

It's defined as —

that you are instructed

that a dangerous weapon means any item capable of
causing

~
THE COURT:

Cite me to —

I've got 311 in front

of me# but Where's — Where's the definition of dangerous
weapon?
MR. BURNS:
7.

It's under the definitions in Title

And I didn't anticipate Mr. Holm's motion, so I don't

have the specific code section at the tip of my tongue.
THE COURT: Where are you reading from?
MR. BURNS:

I'm reading froir the instruction.

THE COURT:

That you submitted earlier?

MR. BURNS:

To the Court.

THE COURT: All right.
the —

Let me see if I can find

a definition.
76-1-601, subsection five.

"'Dangerous weapon'

means any item capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury or facsimile or representation of the item, and:
"(a), the actor's use or apparent intended use
of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe that the
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
"(b), the actor represents to the victim

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

a* I

1

verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of

2

such an item."

3

I'm just reading from that statute.

4

And then "'Serious bodily injury' means bodily

5

injury that creates or causes serious permanent

6

disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the

7

function of any bodily member or organ or creates a

8

substantial risk of death."

9
10

Also defined there is "bodily injury," "possess"
and other —

11

MR. BURNS:

Thank you.

12

THE COURT:

— words.

13

Go ahead.

14

MR. BURNS:

That would be the code section 1

15

would have in mind of defining the word "dangerous weapon"

16

as used in the criminal code in the State of Utah.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. HOLM:

Go ahead with your response.
My response, Your Honor, is I guess

19

we haven't really heard any evidence from anyone to that

20

effect, that they believed this to be a -

21

weapon as it's defined under that provision of the code.

22

a dangerous

And secondly, I guess I've got some problem

23

or —

now with overbreadth, and that is that just about

24

anything —

25

dangerous weapon under the appropriate circumstances, and

a pen or a pencil —

could even be considered a

PAULG.McMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 ^

1

I'm not sure that that 6hould be and was intended to be

2

included.
THE COURT:

3

I'm going to deny the notion.

We'll

4

use the definitions out of the code for the reason that

5

they —

6

and I believe it's a jury call as to whether or not this

7

item which has been referred to as a shank meets the

8

definition or not.

9

the words for referencing are defined in 76-1-601,

There could be any variety of weapons or -items

10

that could be debated one way or the other.

11

is one of them.

12

question, so I'm going to deny the motion.

This —

this

And it appears to me to be a jury

13

MR. BURNS:

14

MR. HOLM:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, the only witness that we

15

would intend to call is Mr. Edge.

16

to the noon hour, and perhaps we ought to just have him —

17
18

THE COURT:

MR. HOLM:

That's —

but I may not give one at

all, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT: Okay.

22

MR. HOLM:

23

you have your opening

statement, too, that you've reserved.

19
20

Start out —

I note that we're close

In fact, it's looking like I probably

won't.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BURNS: And I need —

Okay.
I haven't been told of
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